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Estonian municipalities should perform a broad range of functions, while their fiscal 
resources are often limited and large disparities in fiscal capacity prevail among them. 
Moreover, the power to regulate fiscal affairs is mostly in the hands of the central 
government. We discuss how a strict application of the connexity principle can protect 
municipalities from the fiscal bottleneck. We also recommend the introduction of the 
principle of parallelism and investigate its effects on the unconditional, down-flow grant 
system in Estonia. In particular the procedure of determining the total sum of block grants 
appears to be changed. 
JEL Code: H27, H70, H77, R10. 
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After a phase of transformation leading to a functioning private sector economy and the 
separate establishment of a public sector, a period of consolidation for the public sector 
is needed in new market economies. Estonia comprises a central government and 
municipalities as the sub-national jurisdictions.
1 In part as a consequence of rather 
unbalanced regional development, the fiscal capacity gap among municipalities has 
gradually increased in this country during the last decade. 
In Estonia all municipalities have to perform a broad range of functions, even 
though their fiscal resources are often seriously limited. In order to provide them with 
better chances in a fierce regional competition process, a more equitable financial 
endowment appears to be desirable as an initial condition for further local economic 
development. In addition new task requirements have to be met within the framework of 
the European Union, which in many cases are related to the minimum provision of 
infrastructure services for which the municipalities are responsible according to the 
Estonian constitution. Moreover, this fact bears some conflict potentials because the 
power to regulate fiscal affairs (concerning e.g. conditional grants and/or the size of the 
equalization funds for unconditional grants) is mostly in the hands of the central 
government, while the regulatory competence of the municipalities has remained rather 
weak. Therefore, among other issues, a well-functioning fiscal equalization system 
should be developed to encourage the local efforts to achieve fiscal balance, to improve 
fiscal autonomy and to support the public activities of municipalities. In particular, a 
more stable and predictable vertical equalization system appears to be urgently 
necessary in Estonia. 
This study primarily aims at dealing with the following research topics: 
(1)  How has the existing Estonian vertical equalization system developed? What are its 
regional implications, strengths and weaknesses? 
(2)  Should the connexity principle and the principle of parallelism be chosen as the 
basis of reform?  
                                                 
1 In Estonia, the municipalities consist of the cities (towns) and rural municipalities. In some cases the 
towns and their rural hinterlands form a mixed town-rural municipality.  
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(3)  How should the block grants (unconditional grants) be determined considering 
fiscal need and fiscal capacity indicators, and how could the principle of parallelism 
be introduced in this context? 
(4)  What are the effects on revenue changes that are led by the implementation of the 
parallelism for municipalities? 
(5)  Can we expect more balanced fiscal development of municipalities when applying 
the reform proposal? 
This paper is structured as follows. After this introductory part, the first question is 
tackled in the second section. Information about the characteristics and problems of 
Estonian fiscal equalization is provided there as well. The application of basic principles 
as the reform recommendations and results will be discussed in the third section. The 
final section briefly summarizes the major findings of the paper and discusses the 
anticipated consequences of the reform and concludes. 
 
2   Estonian Fiscal Equalization System 
In Europe the parliament of a country generally has the obligation to provide the 
country’s municipalities with sufficient financial resources to be used at their discretion 
within the framework of their powers. In addition, the need to protect financially weak 
local authorities calls for the fiscal equalization procedures which, however, do not 
diminish the discretionary powers of local authorities to perform their tasks of self-
administration. In Estonia, local government’s responsibility areas are determined by 
the Local Governments Organization Act (KOKS, RT I 1993, 37, 558). Yet, the 
functions of local governments are not always explicitly described. According to a 
survey conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, local government responsibilities 
have already been regulated in the mid-1990s by almost 450 different laws and legal 































Source: Reiljan, Ramcke and Ukrainski (2006). 
 
The main functions of Estonian local governments are explained in a systematic way in 
Reiljan at al. (2006). Estonian local government functions are relatively similar across 
counties (see Figure 1) but their fiscal strength greatly differs from one municipality to 
another. The share of tax revenues of all municipal revenues
2 comprises approximately 
47% of the total revenue of Estonian municipalities. Harju County leads the ranking 
with the share higher than 55%, followed by Tartu County representing the share equal 
to the Estonian average. In South Estonia, the value only amounts to 32 to 34%. In 
approximately half of all counties, tax revenues make up around 41 to 43% of total 
                                                 
2 This relation is used to describe the fiscal autonomy (De Mello 2000). 
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municipal and town revenues. The major source of the Estonian municipal tax revenue 
is personal income tax.
3 The disparities between the share of per capita personal income 
tax receipts in municipal budgets in different Estonian counties and its Estonian average 
have become more apparent during the period 1997–2006. In Harju County, the share of 
per capita income tax receipt was around 36% higher than the Estonian average in the 
period of 1997–2002, while its excess amounted to 31% of the Estonian average for the 
period 2003–2006. The economic recession in Ida-Virumaa led to a drop of income tax 
receipts level from 73% in the period 1997–2006 to 66% of the state average during the 
period 2003–2006. The counties in the eastern and southern parts of Estonia have 
experienced the lowest income tax receipts per inhabitant. The income tax share of all 
municipal revenues differs between the counties but its level presently reaches around 
35 to 38 % in the majority of Estonian counties. Analogously the share of other taxes
4 
of all municipal revenues also differs from one county to another. 
The share of self-revenues (including taxes, sales, rents and interests received) of 
total municipal revenues also varies considerably in Estonia. For example, its share 
comprises approximately 80% in Harju County, whereas in South Estonia the share has 
remained at the 41 to 43% level. In most counties, the share makes up 50 to 55% of 
their total revenues. The regional dispersion of municipal income tax and the dispersion 
of total tax revenue (per inhabitant) decreased over time, while, the regional dispersion 
of self-revenue receipts grew slightly (see Table 1).  
 
                                                 
3 Until 2002, 56% of all income tax collected was given to the municipalities and 44% to the central 
government. During last years, the major tax policy objective was to reduce direct taxes and replace them 
by indirect taxes in Estonia. The personal income tax rate has been gradually reduced from 26% to 21% 
(from 2004 to 2009). Consequently the municipal share of income tax amounted to 11.4% of gross 
income in 2004, while the share grew to 11.9% in 2009. All tax allowances, e.g. for interest rates, costs 
for education and private retirement savings, are made from the central government’s portion of income 
tax, which was 14.6% of gross income in 2004 and 9.1% in 2009. Because of the fiscal problems related 
to the central government budget the reduction of personal income tax rate was stopped in February 2009. 
As a consequence the share of municipalities was reduced to 11.4%, whereas the central government’s 
share increased to 9.6%. 
4 Municipalities in Estonia also collect land tax and they have the right to enforce its rate between 1 to 
2.5% on the land value basis. Many municipalities use the right to waive land tax on residential land 
owned by pensioners for their own use. Land tax in most cases makes up around 2 to 4% of total 
municipal revenues. Moreover Estonian municipalities have the right to establish local taxes, e.g. 
gambling tax, land tax, local sales tax, municipal boat tax, advertisement tax, tax for closing of streets, 
etc. Local taxes on average amount to less than 1% of municipal budgets in Estonia.  
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Table  1  Regional dispersion of municipal self-revenues, tax revenues and 
personal income tax receipts compared to the national average for the periods 
































dispersion*  28.38 28.64 26.92 24.26 27.83  23.96 
 
* Measured in terms of standard deviations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
 
The share of state budget grants of total municipal revenues increased remarkably, 
from 25% in 1997–2002 to 35% in 2003–2006. Since the equalization fund resources 
(with the share of approx. 7%) remained stable, this fact in turn indicates that the share 
of conditional grants grew also steadily, from 18% to 28% in municipal total 
expenditures. State budget grants are of the greatest importance for municipal budgets 
in South Estonia, shown by the share amounted to over 55% in 2003–2006. In Harju 
County, grants from the state budget made up a substantially lower share of total 
municipal expenditure, reaching approximately 10% in the period 1997–2002 and 20% 
in 2003–2006. In the latter period the conditional grants
5 contributed to the increase in 
the relative revenue level by more than 14% compared to the national average in five 
counties, while the drop in Harju County accounted for around the similar extent. The 
significance of conditional grants on the relative revenue level in rural municipalities 
and towns in Pärnu and Ida-Viru counties has been quite low. 
The share of unconditional grants (block grants) of the total volume of central 
government grants to municipalities dropped from 28% in 1997–2002 to 21% in 2003–
2006. The share only rose in Hiiu County (from 18% to more than 25% between these 
two periods). Despite some reduction, equalization grants accounted for 35% of total 
grants in Ida-Viru County and 30–31% in counties in South Estonia. The equalization 
                                                 
5 The majority is given to municipalities to cover specific conditional tasks – paying comprehensive 
school teachers’ salaries, buying textbooks and making investments, paying social aid, (partially) 
covering school lunches and supporting the living environment on small islands (see below).  
 
7
fund has been playing a remarkable role
6 for the local finance of more than 90% of all 
municipalities. Regionally, the importance of the equalization fund varies remarkably. 
About 17% of total revenues in rural municipalities in counties in East and South 
Estonia are presently endowed with the equalization fund provisions. The per capita 
unconditional revenues after the equalization currently vary by 24% on average, with 
some exceptional cases like 100% in Hiiu County and 76% in Ida-Viru and Valga 
counties. The effect of equalization fund provisions on unconditional budgetary 
municipal resources of counties compared to the national average ranges from 24 to 
27% in southern Estonia. The impact of the equalization fund on income growth is also 
remarkable in counties located in eastern Estonia. The loan capacity as the relationship 
between contracted loans and self-revenues has fallen in the majority (around 60%) of 
counties and risen in the rest share of counties during the last ten years. Many 
municipalities finance their expenditures, especially investments, by borrowing. 
For the fiscal equalization of Estonian municipalities and coverage of 
expenditure needs with revenues, the central government plays a leading role. 
According to §154 of the Estonian Constitution, the municipalities which operate 
independently according to the law, decide and organise all elements of life in the local 
area. The same paragraph describes the basis for financing these functions as follows: 
“municipalities can be obligated to fulfil tasks only via law or in agreement with the 
municipality. Expenses connected with tasks designated to the municipality by law will 
be financed from the state budget”. So it is clear that the Estonian Constitution does not 
provide financial autonomy through an independent tax base for the municipalities. The 
§160 of the Estonian Constitution notes, “…the law will resolve management issues in 
the municipality and the supervision of its activities” (Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus 1992). 
In the Law of Municipal Financial Management currently adopted by 
parliament, the Ministry of Finance follows the approach that says the state can 
intervene in municipal activities, including the prescription of ways how local issues 
should be managed (eletuskiri kohaliku omavalitsuse üksuse finantsjuhtimise seaduse 
                                                 
6 Deciding over the size of the equalization fund could be seen as a financial instrument for increasing the 
administrative power of the central government. Less than 10% of all local governments have sufficient 
self-revenues and they are not dependent on the central government’s balancing support. The question 
arises whether such an equalization amount does not stimulate a municipal dependent mentality and 
weakens their own attempts for raising their own revenue (for instance supporting entrepreneurship 
development etc.).  
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eelnõu juurdeseletu 2008). The Ministry of Finance also concludes that the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government does not exclude the option of control over the 
rationale of municipal activities, when this is balanced with the importance of interests 
that need to be protected. Paragraph §9 of the State Budget Law defines the relationship 
between the state budget and municipal budgets, supporting the ideas given in the 
Constitution and specifies: “grants from the state budget are passed to the municipal 
budget via (1) the equalization budget fund; or (2) specific purpose-oriented 
(conditional) grants”. The equalization funds provide the municipalities with block 
grants (Riigieelarve seadus 1999). 
Paragraph §5 on “Revenues of Budget” of the Law of Rural Municipal and 
Town Budgets provides a list of municipal revenue sources on the basis of their 
economic content (Valla ja linnaeelarve seadus 1993): (1) taxes; (2) sales of goods and 
services (including user charges); (3) (one-time) sales of material and immaterial assets; 
(4) income from assets; (5) financial supports including foreign aids; and (6) other 
revenues including fines. The state budget as the source of revenues for municipalities 
and towns is related to the fifth item of the above list, because remarkable supports can 
originate only from the state budget in most cases. Paragraph §8 of the same law 
establishes the options for contracting a loan:  rural municipalities and towns can 
borrow, use capital rent, issue bonds and contract other liabilities.
7 
The Law of the Relationship between Towns or Rural Municipalities and the 
State Budget presents in §1 the objective of the law which is “to determine the basis for 
the provision of funds from the state budget to town and rural municipal budgets and 
also the principles of balancing those budgets”. According to §2 of this law, conditional 
grants have primarily been provided in the fields such as salaries for teachers, family 
doctors, the social tax and unemployment insurance tax  connected to those salaries; 
investments and expenditure connected with the public responsibilities of municipalities 
according to the law. In §2 and §4 the same law refers to the objective of budgetary 
balance – state budget grants are made in order to “complement budget revenues”.
8 
                                                 
7 In the law there are fixed strict restrictions for local borrowings. 
8 “Funding provided in order to increase the local income together with other state budget grants and tax 
revenues should ensure that the town or rural municipality fulfils its responsibilities as set by the law” (§4 
of Valla- ja linneaeelarve seadus 1994).  
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Following §9, there is a support fund in the state budget to cover revenue deficits in 
rural municipal and town budgets. 
The mechanism for verifying the need for budgetary support for rural 
municipalities and towns given in §4 of this law and in §9 of the State Budget Law 
seems at first glance to aim at balancing the interests of the central government and the 
municipalities: the necessary sum to increase local budget revenues will be determined 
by negotiations between a state institution appointed by the central government and the 
municipalities or their unions. However, in the case that an agreement is not reached, 
the size of that sum is determined by the government in the state budget. Paragraph §9 
of the State Budget Law says that “the division of resources in the municipalities budget 
support fund is carried out according to a procedure and in amounts specified by the 
government”. Uniform criteria for the allocation of (unconditional) equalization fund 
and conditional grants among municipalities have been set by the Ministry of Finance 
and these are adjusted to the current economic situation every year when preparing the 
state budget. 
Unions of municipalities are weak institutions with only a few officials, and 
cannot analyse or dispute the rules governing municipal budget supplements or the 
calculation methods developed by ministries with hundreds of civil servants. Currently, 
there is no founded method to assess the expenditures connected with tasks legally 
designated to the municipalities. There is no basis for assessing the different opinions 
during the negotiations between the central government and the municipal 
representatives. The specification of investment support has been totally left to the free 
political choice of the parliament and the central government, which in turn means that 
the municipalities are directly dependent on the central government’s decision. The 
municipal fiscal autonomy is rather restricted in Estonia. 
Further restrictions of fiscal autonomy stem from the potential for the central 
government to intervene in the performance of local activities, the tendency to include 
the debts of municipal enterprise in the volume of debts allowed to a municipality and 
the formulation of need indicators for block grants. In Estonia, several “expenditure 
needs” criteria are applied: (i) the number of children in two different age groups, (ii) 
the number of people in the workforce age, (iii) the number of pension-aged people, and 
to a lesser extent, (iv) the number of people in palliative care as well as (v) the total  
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length of local roads (streets) expressed in kilometres. The choice of such need 
indicators are mainly under the control of the Ministry of Finance thus increasing 
dependence of municipalities on the central government. The central government can 
assist municipalities by increasing the personal income tax rate. However, this policy 
does not help municipalities under fiscal stress much, since the personal income tax 
base in the economically distressed areas tends to be narrow. The fiscal conditions of 
municipal development in Estonia are to a large extent fixed by the fiscal equalization 
policy of the central government. 
Estonian municipalities are generally characterised as being insufficiently 
funded, having a dependant mentality, struggling to obtain a larger share of the state 
budget grants and lacking in motivation to find alternative measures for revenue growth 
(Ulst 2000). In the fast economic growth phase between 2001 and 2007 the fiscal 
situation of the municipalities gradually improved, but during the current economic and 
financial crisis the central government of Estonia introduced the shortening of 
municipal support funds and even cuts of local participation in tax receipts (see Figure 
1) to safeguard the central government budget. 
At present information and research concerning the ‘actual’ expenditure needs of 
municipalities lack in Estonia which can be applied as a basis for equalization purposes 
when granting the down-flow unconditional transfers. Only a calculation of normative 
expenditure based on general characteristics of a municipality exists. However, to 
specify conditional grants, actual expenditure needs of municipalities should ideally be 
considered when accounting the size of a conditional grant. 
A comparison of municipal fiscal data of EU member states suggests that the 
situation in Estonia does not much differ from that in other European countries. In 
particular, two indicators are of interest for the comparison: (a) the financial means 
available to perform municipal tasks expressed by municipal budget expenditure in 
relation to country’s GDP and (b) the fiscal position in relation to higher governments 
indicated by municipal expenditure as a percentage of total government sector 
expenditure. In 2007 the proportion of Estonian GDP (= 8.4%) that the municipalities 
can use was a quarter less compared to the average value for the EU27 (11.2%).
9 At the 
                                                 
9 Often there are more than two government levels in the larger countries, and when financing the public 
activities, the relationships between different government tiers must be resolved within a country (see 
Lenk 2008).  
 
11
same time, in Estonia the share of municipal expenditures of total government 
expenditures was at the EU average level (= 26.1% compared to the EU27 average of 
24.5% in 2007). In Scandinavian countries the share of local government expenditures 
as a percentage of total government expenditures amounted from 40 to 63%. Compared 
to other new EU member states Estonia achieves the same ranking with the Czech 
Republic. 
Therefore, the main weakness related to the fiscal stress in Estonia does not 
primarily concern the size of municipal expenditures – although this could be higher 
because of the needs for local infrastructure – but the fiscal equalization, the autonomy 
of municipalities and the regional dispersion of expenditures seem to be in a more 
serious situation. To reduce these regional divergences, to increase and protect the fiscal 
autonomy of municipalities, and also to decrease local government dependencies on 
political constellations in the central government, an improvement of the fiscal 
equalization system in Estonia appears to be necessary. 
 
3   Guiding Principles for Changing Fiscal Equalization 
3.1   The Connexity Principle 
One group of principles that has to be introduced to stabilize the autonomy and 
competences of municipalities relates to the so-called connexity principle. This 
principle states that an imputation of a new function or a reallocation of functions from 
the central government to the municipalities is only allowed if the central government 
provides the municipalities with the necessary means to perform the function 
successfully (Zimmermann 1999). In some EU member countries the downward shift of 
public tasks from a higher government to a municipal level has quite often taken place 
while leaving the fiscal burden to the municipalities. In addition, the assignments of 
public activities and their finance formulated in constitutions have also often been 
unclear in some countries including Estonia. Although the subsidiarity principle has 
been widely acknowledged as a mechanism to protect the lower-level government and 
its activities, solely municipal tasks have been defined in this context, while the  
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discussion about the ways of safeguarding the municipal fiscal autonomy to finance the 
assigned local activities has often been lacking. 
In some state constitutions of the German Länder the connexity principle is 
fixed. Consequently the states shifting the tasks to the municipalities should cover the 
administration costs of these tasks. But it is still controversial to what extent the 
municipalities should get compensated financially. Sometimes difficulties also arise 
because municipalities might be unprotected by the federal government which is the 
case in Germany. In this country municipalities can bring the related disputes only to 
their own state court. Only in cooporation with the state constitutional court can a case 
be brought to the federal constitutional court as well. In a rather few exceptional cases 
the matter can be treated and discussed before a European court. Or – if a connexity 
principle is formulated under the present conditions in Estonia – the central government 
has legal possibilities to influence the volume and allocation of municipal expenses and 
their finance.  
Repeatedly, if the connexity principle applies, the central government should 
take over the administrative costs of the tasks transferred to the local governments. In 
this context another question arises about the ways how to identify these costs. As 
municipalities have the organizational autonomy, they are able to determine these costs 
through the selection of cost assessment, distribution, and calculation methods. 
Therefore, they can influence the cost estimation process, which would lead to the 
determination of higher costs that should be then compensated by the central 
government. Another possibility to be applied would be to assign standard costs. But to 
what types of municipality should these standard costs refer? It is also questionable 
whether the municipalities may perform the task transferred to them (as their own 
activity) in an adequate way. Otherwise the task fulfilment is just an administrative act 
executed for the central government. Therefore, doubts will emerge with respect to the 
appropriate costs to be compensated. 
A debate on fair costs is likely to end up with a standard cost formulation. In this 
theoretical framework a vertical principal-agent game between municipalities (as a 
group or individual municipalities) and the state ministry of finance (as representative of 
the central government) will take place. There might also be a Nash solution between 
the negotiating partners, or a powerful central government leaves the municipalities at  
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their minimum utility that is just high enough to execute the local function assigned. 
This is shown in the Diagram (a) of Figure 2 with the curve UCG showing total utility 
of the central government (if it carries out the public activity alone) and the curve 
UminM demonstrating the minimum utility of a municipality that gets higher with the 
level of local service activities X. The net utility of central government is just the 
difference between the value of UCG and UminM of a service volume X. The best task 
performance that the central government can achieve is the point where marginal total 
utility equals marginal minimum utility of a municipality (Gravelle and Rees 1992).  
The standard cost in the sense of central government should be determined in 
such a way that this solution is achieved. There is a danger that financial means given to 
the municipalities turn out to be rather small. As a consequence, other self-
administrative tasks of the municipalities get hindered or become unfeasible. Another 
solution would be to maximize the total utility (see the Diagram (b) of Figure 2). In this 
case the solution will be an activity level where the marginal total benefit becomes zero. 
With a powerful central government the municipalities can still be kept on their 
minimum level path, however, the activity level (i.e. the task performance) as the 
maximum of total utility outcome is higher than that in the case of maximizing total 
utility minus the minimum utility of the municipalities – see Diagram (a) of Figure 2. 
Yet the gains between the central government and the municipalities have to be 
distributed through the definition of standard costs and payments to cover them. In the 
case of negotiations where the municipalities possess more power, a Nash solution 
maximizing the product of differences between utility and minimum utility of both 
partners will be achieved.
10 
If risks are considered when deriving a solution, one may better turn to the 
traditional principle-agent models (Gravelle and Rees 1992). If the central government 
takes risks with respect to the activity results of the municipalities while having 
information about the amount of local activities, a constant payment just for 
performance of tasks is the best compensation scheme for the central government. If the 
activities of the municipalities cannot be detected properly the payment of central 
government should increase as the activity levels grow. 
 
                                                 
10 (UCG – UminCG)*(UM–UminM) → max, where UM denotes the utility of a municipality (see also 
Friedrich, Gwiazda and Nam 2004).  
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Figure 2  Vertical principal-agent game between a model municipality and the 
central government 
 




Source: Authors’ conception. 
 
We argued here in terms of the utility. However, the utility can be expressed differently 
according to individual goals (such as health, education, environment, transportation, 
safety, etc.), economic goals like employment, social goals, etc. (Eichhorn and Friedrich 
1976). The models should be modified with respect to these various goals to be 
achieved. For example, the utility can be expressed by employment as a central 
government goal and ensuring minimum employment in a community as the local goal. 
There may also be a bundle of goals including political ones where the result depends 
on different mixes of the goals as well leading to quite different compensations. An 
indicator of social welfare like net-benefit may be used as well, encountering the 
difficulty that a nationwide social welfare differs from the local welfare of the citizens 
of a municipality. 
The financial means to compensate municipalities’ expenditures related to their 
activities should ideally be transferred through conditional grants. Funding these 
functions by block grants, which all Estonian municipalities do not receive, should be 
limited. Some municipalities would be excluded from the compensation according to 
UCG
UminM 









11 Other communities might minimize the performance of the 
new or transferred tasks in order to improve the services of pure self-administration by 
the unconditioned grant. 
The character of public activities to be transferred should be determined and 
described in terms of certain appropriate criteria. A basic research program should be 
developed to identify such criteria, also referring to some organizational indicators of 
management capacities of such municipalities, and including the potentials of other 
types of local institutions such as cross-municipal associations like the FOCJ 
(Functional Overlapping competing Jurisdiction) to perform such municipal functions 
(Friedrich and Reiljan 2008). Towns endowed with some special functions in regional 
and urban planning with regard to environment, tourist centres, water protection, 
industries, transportation, etc. might be included in the criteria list. 
When realizing the connexity concept, some sub-principles related to its legal 
stipulation should also be kept in mind (Zimmermann 1999; Blankart and Borck 2004; 
Friedrich, Gwiazda and Nam 2004). First of all, the connexity principle should be 
formulated in detail in the constitution and adequately considered in laws related to the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations between the different government tiers. Its 
consideration should be then enforced through the cases and decisions of the 
constitutional court of Estonia. A specification of the connexity principle has to deal 
with EU tasks or central government tasks that are under the direct control of the EU. It 
might be stipulated that the EU itself or the central government has to compensate 
municipalities. The compensation scheme for task transfers and fiscal assistances should 
also consider the subsidization schemes laid down in laws or general decrees. These 
measures could also be accompanied by strengthening municipalities’ political power 
by providing a wider scope of local decision making competences in negotiations 
concerning the vertical public task transfers (Friedrich, Gwiazda and Nam 2004).  
 
 
                                                 
11 The inclusion of ‘people in palliative care’ to the expenditure need indicators in Estonia since 2006 is 
related to the fact that the responsibility for this task was handed over from the central government to the 
municipalities and the equalization fund was increased. Two problems emerged, however. Firstly, for 
those municipalities not receiving a share of the equalization fund, their legitimate right to obtain extra 
financial means for an additional task is being violated. Secondly, resources intended to fulfill a certain 
task cannot be connected with the equalization fund principle.  
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3.2.   The Principle of Parallelism 
The vertical fiscal relation between central government and municipalities is a crucial 
issue in Estonia. The amount of financial grants addressed to the individual 
municipalities depends on the total sum of money devoted to such intergovernmental 
transfers. This is called the equalization fund in Estonia. There should be a law defining 
the conditions for the content and size of the equalization funds. This has to express 
general rules of equalization funds formation whereas individual conditions could be 
fixed in a yearly fiscal equalization law. That means that the financial sources for this 
purpose should be stated as a percentage share of specified revenues of the central 
government, and in addition concerning public debts incurred by the central 
government. The relationship between block grants and conditional grants should leave 
a minimum share for block grants. However, the volume of the equalization fund should 
be in line with the principle of parallelism. 
We suggest the implementation of Saxon style principle of parallelism between 
the central government and the municipalities in Estonia. It says that the development of 
disposable municipal revenues should be in parallel with the central government’s 
disposable revenue. In order to safeguard the finance of self-administration in 
municipalities there should be a parallel development of own resources of central 
government and of municipalities. Politicians are obliged to consider such a parallelism 
when they determine the equalization funds for block grants. Exemptions from this 
principle should only be allowed according to the specifications in the law concerning 
war, epidemics, deep economic crises, natural disasters, serious demographic 
difficulties, etc. A crucial problem to be solved is the definition of relevant own 
disposable revenues. To define disposable revenues one may turn to the cash flow that 
is at the disposal of central government or at the disposal of municipalities. Such a cash 
flow which is used in Germany to measure the fiscal possibilities and situation of 
municipalities refers to all revenues minus the inevitable expenses of the municipality. 
This indicator is named ‘free top (freie Spitze)’. For the central government, an 
additional question also emerges, whether down-flow grants to municipalities become 
part of the inevitable expenditures of the central government or not. As they are not 
available to the central government they should be deducted. The central government of 
Estonia receives tax revenues from own taxes, shared taxes, payments from the EU,  
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revenues from fees, sanctions, borrowings, sales of state property, dividends of central 
state enterprises, 25% of customs duties and other revenues. Yet the customs revenues 
are exclusively transmitted to the EU. Service fees are formed primarily according to 
the cost coverage and benefit principle. Since they mostly do not increase the financial 
scope of the central government, they should be excluded as well. Profits received from 
the Estonian central bank should be included (see Friedrich and Ramke 2007).  
Again for the municipalities, tax revenues consist of their own resources as well 
as revenues from concessions. Dividends of municipal enterprises can be included in the 
own resource criteria, too. Payments of sanctions to the municipalities increase also the 
own fiscal resources. Unlike the conditional grants, the block, unconditional grants 
increase the own financial revenues. Revenues from fees, public debt and property sale 
should be excluded as already mentioned above. Donations by private individuals that 
are not related to the additional municipal expenses can be added, too. If they are linked 
to additional expenses, e.g. construction or renewal of a building to host an art 
collection, the net fiscal inflow may also be added. 
In Estonia a formula for the intergovernmental fiscal equalization exists already. 
The formula for calculating the amount of the down-flow subsidy (Tn) aimed at 
supporting the achievement of local governments balance can be expressed as the 
difference between the normative revenue and the expenditure levels: 
 
Tn= (ak –  an)*0.9        
 
where: 
•  an means the normative level of revenues from personal income tax, land tax 
and charges for the use of natural resources that go to the budget of a local 
government unit in a given budget year
12; 
•  ak denotes the level of normatively calculated demand for payments (costs) of a 
municipal budget in a given fiscal year
13; and  
                                                 
12 The normative municipal revenue level (i.e. the capacity indicator an) is the product of the following 
three local revenue data: (1) personal income tax receipts for the last three years, which is multiplied by 
the income tax accounting growth rate coefficient (i.e. two thirds of the average coefficient of income tax 
growth for the last two years); (2) accounting land tax sum, using the land tax rate of 1.25% (the 
municipality can establish the land tax rate within a range between 1 to 2.5%); and (3) prognosis of 
received charges for the use of natural resources.  
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•  0.9 indicates that block grants have to cover 90% of the difference between the 
normative revenues and normative expenditures. 
The calculation of the normative expenditure demand in municipalities involves a 
process of harmonizing two dimensions. On the one side, the forecasted level of 
municipal revenue from taxes and charges on the use of natural resources is found using 
the above mentioned self-revenue sources. On the other side, negotiations between the 
central government and the municipalities result in a political decision reflected in the 
State Budget Law about the size of equalization fund which is designed to help reduce 
municipal and town budget deficits in the corresponding budget year. 
For the individual municipalities the calculated normative revenues are firstly 
compared to the normative expenditure needs, and then the negative results (i.e. the 
revenue deficits) are added together for all municipalities suffering from the fiscal 
stress. The total sum of municipal revenue deficits will be then multiplied by the factor 
0.9 and the outcome of this computation should be the same as the sum of the 
equalization fund politically set. Formally expressed, the revenue deficits for covering 
the normative costs of all rural municipalities and towns are compensated via the central 
government grants by exactly 90%.  
Table 2 depicts a thorough modification of the expenditure coefficients in 2004: 
those for the indicators like ‘7-18 years old children’, ’65 years old and older’ and 
‘volume of roads’ increased while those for others declined. Since 2005 expenditure 
coefficients increased gradually for all the need indicators. When calculating the growth 
rate of the expenditure coefficient, the normative municipal revenue growth has been 
taken into account so that the equalization fund would cover exactly 90% of the 
normative revenue deficit.
14 Once again one should note that this is solely an equation 
applied for the entire sum of equalization fund among municipalities and it does not 
                                                                                                                                               
13 The normative level of municipal budget expenditures (i.e. the needs indicator ak) is calculated by 
multiplying cost formation indicators with the cost coefficient connected with the indicator unit. As a cost 
formation basis the following indicators are viewed: (1) the number of 0-6 years old children; (2) the 
number of 7-18 years old children; (3) the number of 19-64 years old workforce; (4) the number of 65 
years old and older; (5) the length of roads (streets in km); and (6) the number of people in palliative care. 
14 When using the equalization fund to cover 90% of the municipal or town normative revenue deficit, the 
task of unifying the financing for public sector services is fulfilled quite well. Assume that there are two 
municipalities and the normative revenues of the first municipality cover 90% of the normative 
expenditure demand whereas the coverage share amounts to 50% for the second municipality. By the 
given 90% equalization coefficient, the first one gets 9% compensation from the equalization fund and 
the other gets 45% of the normative expenditure demand. After such an adjustment, the coverage rate of 
the normative expenditures increases to 99% for the first municipality and to 95% for the second.  
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deal with the actual expenditure demand and revenue surplus or the deficit assessment 
problem. Less than 10% of all municipalities – mainly from Harju County (including 
the capital Tallinn) and Ida-Viru County (rural municipalities with high receipts from 
oil shale mining) – have their normative revenues higher than their normative 
expenditure needs. Those municipalities are left out of the division of the equalization 
fund. 
 
Table  2  Expenditure coefficients per expenditure indicator unit used for 




Expenditure coefficients per indicator unit 
(in thousands of Estonian kroons) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0–6 years old  13.228  8.422 9.473  10.727 13.146 15.282 17.391 
7–18 years old  2.231  6.698 7.533 8.530  10.454 12.152 13.829 
19–64 years old  4.973  2.818 3.170 3.590 4.330 5.033 5.728 
65 years old and 
older 3.302  4.094 4.605 5.214 6.290 7.312 8.321 
volume of roads 
(streets), km  4.264  29.103 32.734 37.065 44.710 51.973 59.145 
people in 
palliative  care      -  7.000 8.444 9.816  11.170 
 
Source: Ministry of finance adjustment fund calculations 2003–2009, collected by authors. 
 
The parallelism has not yet been considered in Estonian fiscal equalization system 
because: (1) the total sum of block grants determined annually has been the result of 
political decision of parliament about the state budget; and (2) the central government 
has changed the relations of the expenditure coefficients and, by doing so, also the 
expenditure level assessment of the individual municipalities. 
Friedrich et al. (2004) have shown how in Saxony the principle of parallelism is 
integrated into the model of vertical fiscal equalization between the state and its 
municipalities. Analogously, the concept of parallelism concerns the municipalities’ 
disposable income  t EG  and the provided intergovernmental transfers (by the central 
government)  t SZ . The disposable revenue by the central government is t EL . From this 
disposable income we deduct the down-flow grants from the central government to 
municipalities t SZ . The size of the intergovernmental transfers is fixed in the period of  
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zero ( 0 = t ) at a certain percentage share of the disposable income of the central 
government (see also Nam, Parsche and Steinherr 2001). 
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If equation 4 is used to account the block grants for Estonian municipalities we achieve 






Table 3  Calculations of the parallelism for block grants in Estonia 
 
 









































1997  13660  3441.4  704.79  17102  4146.2  12955  0.2424  0.7576    
1998 14952 3956.2  695.69  18908  4651.9  14256  0.246  0.754  627.9   
1999 14679 4155.1  736.8  18834  4891.9  13942  0.2597  0.7403  411.08   
2000 16342 4213.3  866.5  20555  5079.8  15475  0.2471  0.7529  770.16   
2001 18018 4636.5  951.8  22654  5588.3  17066  0.2467  0.7533  855.9   
2002  21018  5246.8  1153.3  26265  6400.1  19865  0.2437  0.7563 1121   
2003 23965 5595.2  1150.4  29560  6745.6  22814  0.2282  0.7718  1571.5  1607.9 
2004 26402 6309.3  987.83  32712  7297.1  25414  0.2231  0.7769  1621.5  1661.8 
2005 30492 7144.6  1000.5  37636  8145.1  29491  0.2164  0.7836  1980.2  2026.5 
2006 37268 8777.8  1143.8  46046  9921.6  36124  0.2155  0.7845  2385.9  2442.6 
2007 46098 10974  1430 57072  12404  44668 0.2173  0.7827  2862.5  2932.8 
2008 42737 12837  1347.2 55574 14184 41390  0.2552  0.7448  636.73  705.17 
 
Note: 1997 and 2002 are reference years for the parallelism. 




The first attempt refers to the year 1997 as a base year. Column (3) of Table 3 shows the 
actual block grants and column (9) the block grants under the parallelism. The results 
reveal that under the parallelism conditions of 1997, the block grants paid would have 
been lower than the actual ones. However, since 2002 the block grants under the 
parallelism would have been considerably higher than the actually paid ones. In 2008 
the economic recession tended to affect the municipalities seriously. As shown in 
column (10), similar results are also obtained if the conditions of 2002 are used as 
reference for the parallelism. Under the parallelism both levels of governments are 
gaining from a prosperous economic development and vice versa. Until 2009 the yearly 
actual total block grants SZt were determined in Estonia as a result of parliament 
decision about the central government budget. Under the prevailing conditions a 
paternalistic central government can protect the municipalities but also expand its 
influence on the costs of municipalities. The parallelism solution gives the 
municipalities a larger scope of autonomy to perform their own tasks if block grants and 
referring tasks are strictly separated from the conditional grants: The latter ones should 
be paid only to finance the transferred local tasks and to support some self-
administration tasks which seem to be important from the central government’s point of 
view. 
The parallelism can also be integrated into the Estonian block grant assignment 
system as well. The block grants of a municipality i at year t amount to  
 
SZit = (akit  – anit)*0.9, if akit > anit and 0 if akit < anit    (5) 
 
For the total sum of block grants must hold: 
 
SZt = (∑akjt – ∑anjt)*0.9             (6) 




SZt/0.9 + ∑anjt =∑akjt       (7) 




For the municipality i we obtain: 
 
                                                                    n–i 
SZit = (SZt/0.9 + ∑anjt – ∑akjt – anit)*0.9      (8) 
                                                          j           j 
 
We may introduce the parallelism according to equation (4): 
 
SZit = 0.9*[{ELt* ) /( ) ( 0 0 0 0 EG EL SZ EG + +  – EGt*(EL0 – SZ0)/(EL0 + EG0)}/0.9    
                      n–i 
+ ∑anjt – ∑akjt – anit ]                                                                         (9) 
           j            j 
 
As is the case with the existing system, the cost coefficient and the total fund sum for 
block grants are determined in this context. The relation of cost coefficients – not their 
absolute values – should be fixed and the block grants funds should underlie the 
parallelism. Then the amount of block grants for a municipality is determined by its 
own indicator structure, the total block grant funds, the need indicators of other 
municipalities, the sum of all fiscal indicators and its own fiscal capacity indicator. The 
cost coefficients vary, but the relation between them remains unchanged. Factor 0.9 is 
given. Therefore, all municipalities in financial need get the same percentage of 
normative budget deficit equalized. 
 
4  Consequences for Local Fiscal Equalization in Estonia  
There are several principal implications of the parallelism as a measure to strengthen the 
fiscal autonomy of municipalities. The parallelism is based on the idea that the 
assignment of tasks between central government and municipalities should be stable or 
is expected to be stable. Estonia has to overcome difficulties as the public sector is still 
in a transformation process. The wish to provide the municipalities with a high 
autonomy degree conflicts with the practical experience in the country where politicians 
like to lead and manage its economy and public sector in terms of ad hoc intervention. 
Therefore, some changes in task performance of municipalities are caused by the fiscal  
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interference of the central government. This would be reduced if a certain level of stable 
parallelism constant exists. One also has to admit that a small country has to cope more 
often with political, economic and social crises, epidemics, etc. and reactions to them 
that cannot be much controlled because the causes of such developments are originated 
abroad. 
Moreover, there are political, economic and public management goal conflicts 
among the central government and the municipalities. A mechanism must be formulated 
for checking and changing the parallelism. A solution might concern a corridor of 
change by stipulating the upper and lower levels in the constitution. A negotiation 
procedure might be installed that leads to a Nash solution in a commission where 
Estonian municipalities have half of the seats and a voting power which equals that of 
the central government. The commission has to find a solution within a specified time 
scope. A referee solution should be foreseen if the commission does not come to terms. 
For constitutionally fixed (rather rare) cases an emergency procedure may be installed. 
If such institutional solutions are not available, a parallelism constant might be found 
for a year where the fiscal stress for central government and municipalities was 
relatively low. In other words, for that year the own revenues for central government 
and for municipalities should be determined as the so-called benchmarks.  
A further problem implies surrounding the ways to fix the specified grants. They 
should follow the connexity principle and assist the municipalities with respect to 
investment and municipality tasks which should have the priorities for the entire public 
sector. However, they should not sweep out the block grants and by this way skip the 
parallelism. In addition total minimum amounts of block grants should be fixed. A 
similar institutional arrangement as stated above might be helpful also in this case. In 
this way public tasks for which the central government and Estonian municipalities have 
to perform together can be considered, which include, for example, regional planning, 
large infrastructure provision etc. 
Furthermore, the conditional grants for tasks related to the connexity principle or 
the assistance of municipalities to perform nationwide important tasks should be fixed at 
a minimum referring to a base year. It could be a special percentage of all grants of that 
base year. This amount may grow according to the growth rate of the central 
government budget. The equalization funds should be determined according to the  
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condition shown in equation (4) after fixing the own revenues and the block grants in a 
base year. A certain level of parallelism constant can also be introduced in a more 
normative way as choosing normative own revenues and block grants to get a more 
favourable solution for the municipalities. Through the implementation of the 
parallelism those municipalities which are suffering from serious fiscal stress – 
especially those located in eastern and southern Estonia – would experience significant 
gains, when the economic situation improves. 
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